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ABSTRACT 
This paper addresses the extraterritorial dimension of 
transnational corporations, focusing on the corporate 
accountability-deficit that characterizes the current 
International legal framework. The analysis looks at parent 
companies’ civil liability for environmental harm caused 
abroad. By introducing a selected number of foreign direct 
liability cases brought before European national courts, the 
paper investigates whether the binding environmental and 
human rights reporting obligations contained in Directive 
2014/95/EU contribute to the determination of a parent 
company’s duty of care towards its overseas subsidiaries, 
and consequently establish their potential liability.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Economic globalization resulted in, and is itself the result 
of growing cross-border trade in goods and services, wide 
technological spread, deregulation of the market and, most 
importantly for the purposes of this paper, increasing cross-
border production and division of labor within enterprises 
in different countries (Shangquan, 2000). Business entities 
have been adapting their structure, as well as their 
production methods as a way to increase profits and reduce 
production costs to the minimum (Enneking, 2012), even at 
the detriment of environmental and human rights 
protection. As a result, transnational corporations (TNCs) 
have become some of the most prominent players in the 
current social, political and economic arena.  
 
TNCs normally conduct their business activities through 
foreign direct investments (FDIs), which entail the 
existence of a long-term relationship between an enterprise 
and another enterprise resident in a different economy, 
along with different degrees of influence at the 
management level (OECD, 2001). Oftentimes the parent 
company of a TNC is located in a developed country (for 
instance the US or a European country), while its 
subsidiaries are located in a developing country, where 
factors of production are cheaper and regulatory standards 
related to environment, health and safety and human rights 
are often less rigorous. 
 
Against this setting, where economic entities have the 
ability to conduct their businesses transnationally and affect 
communities and environment beyond their home state’s 
borders, the current International legal framework still lags 
behind in addressing its adverse consequences. As a result, 
TNCs’ environmental and human rights accountability 
remains highly dependent on each state’s ability and 
willingness to deal with the issue (Mason, 2005). This 
becomes particularly problematic when developing host 
countries may be incentivized to lower their regulatory 
standards in order to attract foreign investments (Enneking, 
2012). For this reason, attempts have been advanced, at the 
national level, to bring civil liability claims (mainly cases 
of negligence) against TNCs in their home countries. The 
plaintiffs of these so-called foreign direct liability claims 
strive to recognize the extraterritorial accountability of 
parent companies, which are “the entities with the ultimate 
control over and profits from their international operations” 
(Enneking, 2012). 
 
This paper advances arguments on the furtherance of 
European parent companies’ accountability through 
mandatory CSR reporting, taking as an example the 
obligation to disclose non-financial information under 
Directive 2014/95/EU. The latter has the objective of 
increasing the level of transparency of the activities of 
corporations, in relation to environmental, labor and social 
matters, in order to create more sustainable business 
models. At the time of writing, no judicial or statutory 
interpretation was identified concerning the actual impact 
of the reporting obligation on foreign direct liability claims 
before European national courts. The reader should 
therefore be aware that the arguments advanced are based 
on consideration on what the law should be (de lege 
ferenda), rather than what the law currently is (de lege 
lata). Nonetheless, a number of national judgments, 
statutes and soft law instruments will be considered, in 
order to support the argument that the non-financial 
reporting obligation of Directive 2014/95/EU implies a 
parent company’s duty of care, for the purposes of foreign 
direct liability cases brought before European national 
courts. 
 
FOREIGN DIRECT LIABILITY AS A WAY TO ADDRESS 
TNCS’ OVERSEAS HARM 
Direct liability claims brought against TNCs’ parent 
companies in their home countries constitute a way to hold 
the latter accountable for environmental harm caused in the 
host countries. Many have argued that the role of civil 
liability (tort law) actions in this context is, however, rather 
limited, for a number of reasons: it is a very time 
consuming and expensive practice, primarily concerned 
with individual interests rather than common ones (such as 
environmental protection), and claims can be brought 
against the wrongdoer solely by a plaintiff with an interest 
at stake (Wilde, 2013). This is particularly problematic in 
cases of environmental damage, which cannot be judged 
unless an individual’s interest or property is affected, as a 
result. However, in the absence of an effective International 
corporate liability regime, national civil liability systems 
remain, although not the most desirable, among the few 
tools to address the global dimension of corporate actors. 
At the European level, this type of claims is based on 
general principles of domestic tort law and normally 
concerns violations of TNCs’ duties of care towards their 
subsidiaries’ employees or the communities and 
environment of the host countries in which they operate. At 
present, European national courts have finally adjudicated a 
limited number of foreign direct liability cases, leading to 
very little guidance on the extent and determination of a 
parent company’s duty of care for the acts of its 
subsidiaries (Muchlinski, Rouas, 2014). 
 
PARENT COMPANIES’ DUTY OF CARE 
 
TNCs’ accountability for overseas environmental harm and 
human rights violations is highly dependent on their 
corporate structure. Often, the creation of complex forms of 
ownership and control over subsidiaries all over the world 
reduces parent companies’ exposure to liability. Many 
TNCs are organized in corporate groups, defined by 
Blumberg as “enterprises organized in the form of a 
dominant parent company with scores or hundreds of 
subservient sub-holding, subsidiary, and affiliated 
companies”, which form a single-integrated enterprise 
under the control of one common entity (Blumberg, 2005). 
Each corporate entity has its own separate legal personality 
and the liability of shareholders is completely separated 
from that of the company’s. The issue of holding a parent 
company responsible for the acts of its subsidiaries must 
adapt to these circumstances. Accordingly, parent 
companies can be either held indirectly liable for their 
subsidiaries activities, through the invocation of the veil-
piercing doctrine, or directly liable for their acts or 
omissions (Demeyere, 2015). This paper addresses this 
second form of corporate liability, focusing on violations of 
legal responsibilities towards overseas communities and 
environment. 
 
The British courts’ approach to determine the existence 
of a parental duty of care 
Due to a number of procedural reasons, the foreign direct 
liability cases so far adjudicated before European national 
courts have failed to effectively recognize parent 
companies’ duty of care for the harm caused during their 
overseas activities. What is certain is that the plaintiffs of 
such civil actions generally claim that the parent company 
of a foreign subsidiary breached a duty of care and that the 
failure to exercise due diligence eventually resulted in some 
form of damage to the local community and environment. 
For instance, in Lubbe v. Cape clp, the claimant alleged 
that the parent company (Cape clp) was aware that 
exposure to asbestos was gravely injurious to human health 
and failed to take proper steps to ensure that proper 
working practices were followed and that safety 
precautions were observed throughout the whole group, 
including its foreign subsidiaries in South Africa. In a 
series of foreign direct liability claims brought against 
Royal Dutch Shell plc (RDS) in the Netherlands, when 
addressing the issue of Shell’s parental duties towards the 
injured Nigerian community, the Court of Appeal made 
reference to a British case, namely Chandler v. Cape plc, in 
which the judge formulated criteria useful to determine a 
parent company’s duty of care in national tort actions. 
Although the Dutch court’s final pronouncement on the 
application of this or other tests is still awaiting, and 
keeping in mind that an English court’s pronouncement is 
nowhere binding upon Dutch or other European national 
courts, it is worth analyzing the Chandler criteria, which 
remain the most recent and relied on developments 
regarding the determination of parental duty of care in 
direct liability claims against TNCs.   
 
The Applicable Criteria 
In principle, according to the Chandler’s judgment, a 
parent company’s duty of care arises when the businesses 
of the parent company and its subsidiary are in a relevant 
part the same, and when the parent company is a position 
of knowing, or should have known that the subsidiary’s 
activities were harming people and environment. In order 
to assess this last criterion, the court should look at the 
relationship of the two entities in a broad perspective, 
investigating whether the parent company had a practice of 
intervening in the trading operations of the subsidiary, 
concerning, for instance, funding or production issues 
(Chandler v. Cape plc). Thus, a duty of care arises when 
the parent company is in a position of knowing or should 
know about its subsidiary’s harmful behavior. In the case, a 
direct relationship between the parent company and the 
subsidiary’s employees seemed not to be an essential 
element to establish a duty of care; rather, the matter 
revolved around the failure of the parent company to advise 
the subsidiary, when the latter was found in breach of its 
own duty of care towards its employees (Palombo, 2015). 
 
It must be noted that the Chandler case was set in a 
national context, where both corporate entities (namely 
Cape plc and Cape Building Products Ltd.) were located in 
the United Kingdom. Thus, the test developed therein, and 
used to establish the existence of the parent company’s 
duty of care, does not specifically refer to foreign direct 
liability cases. However, considering the interpretation of 
“proximity” delivered by the Appellate Court in the case, 
which deals with the parent company’s knowledge or 
assumption of knowledge about the subsidiary’s harmful 
behavior rather than a geographical proximity between the 
two entities, it can be reasonably assumed that the test 
would be applicable extraterritorially (Palombo, 2015), and 
thus be relevant for the purposes of this paper. This 
position seems to be confirmed in two foreign direct 
liability cases recently brought in the UK, namely AAA and 
Ors v. Unilever Plc and Lungowe and Others v. Vedanta 
Resources Plc, where the British High Court of Justice, in 
its preliminary rulings, addressed the Chandler test when 
assessing the feasibility of the claims against the two 
parent companies. 
 
THE IMPACT OF NON-FINANCIAL REPORTING 
OBLIGATIONS ON THE DETERMINATION OF A DUTY 
OF CARE 
 
Thereby, in order to determine a parent company’s duty of 
care, which is a necessary element to establish the latter’s 
civil liability, the attention is drawn on investigating the 
factual existence of a practice of intervening in the trading 
operations of the subsidiary. This inevitably remains highly 
dependent on the specific facts of each of the cases. The 
absence of a clear definition of what constitutes a relevant 
“practice of intervening” in the trading operations of the 
subsidiary risks limiting the determination of such duty of 
care in a coherent manner. 
 
This problem would be in part overcome, as it is argued in 
this paper, were the courts to base their assessment on the 
existence of a binding obligation upon parent companies to 
acquire information about their whole activities’ 
environmental impact. By doing so, a company’s failure to 
recognize the adverse impacts of its subsidiaries’ 
operations would no longer be assessed as a question of 
fact, where the court would merely assess whether the 
company was in a position of knowing about its 
subsidiary’s harmful behavior, through investigating the 
parent company's practice of intervening in the trading 
operations of its subsidiaries. Rather, the breach of a 
binding obligation to exercise human rights and 
environmental due diligence would be considered as a 
question of law, upon which it would be possible to attach 
legal consequences for the parent company. 
 
The Non-Financial Reporting Directive 
In September 2014, the Council of the EU adopted 
Directive 2014/95/EU on disclosure of non-financial 
information by certain large companies. It is regarded as a 
considerable step forward, towards the creation of a more 
comprehensive and holistic CSR mandatory framework at 
the EU level. Public-interest entities, including public 
interest entities that are parent undertakings of a corporate 
group, with more than 500 employees registered in their 
balance sheet, are now required to produce a non-financial 
statement containing a brief description of the 
undertaking’s business model, a description of the policies 
pursued to tackle, inter alia, environmental matters, 
including information about the due diligence processes 
implemented, the outcome of those policies, the risks 
related to the company’s operations and the ways the 
company manages such risks. All EU MSs were required to 
transpose Directive 2014/95/EU into their national legal 
systems by 6 December 2016. According to the EU 
Commission, the new reporting rules would apply to 
around 6000 companies and corporate groups across the 
EU (EU Commission, 2014).  
 
Non-Financial Reporting as an Option? 
Pursuant to Directive 2014/95/EU, the parent company of a 
large group of undertakings, which encompasses a parent 
company and its subsidiaries, must create a consolidated 
non-financial statement, including all the information 
necessary to understand the impact of the entire group’s 
operations on people and environment. 
 
Considering the recent interpretation delivered by the Court 
of Appeal in Chandler v. Cape, the determination of a 
parent company’s duty of care concerns, inter alia, the 
latter’s knowledge or assumption of knowledge about its 
subsidiary’s harmful behavior. Even at first sight, the 
connection between this assumption of knowledge and a 
parent company's obligation to perform environmental and 
human rights due diligence seems apparent. As a matter of 
fact, by obtaining information concerning environmental 
matters, health and safety, greenhouse gas emissions, air 
pollution, as well as the specific risks related to the 
business operations, a parent company’s knowledge about 
potential harmful behaviors throughout its whole corporate 
group is readily assumed.  
 
Notably, the determination of a parent company’s duty of 
care, based on the existence of a CSR commitment, is not 
unprecedented. In a 2008 French civil liability case 
concerning marine oil pollution, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the oil giant Total was directly liable for an oil spill 
that occurred on the high sea, due to the poor vetting 
operations performed on the tanker Erika. Total was the 
parent company of a whole corporate group, including 
Erika’s charterer, and had adopted an internal and 
voluntary vetting procedure to determine the tankers’ 
suitability to transport crude oil and other hazardous 
substances. It was held that Total, by ignoring the bad state 
of maintenance of the Erika, had acted recklessly and with 
knowledge that an accident could have occurred (Gahlen, 
2014). The court thus recognized the parent company’s 
duty of care based on its voluntary commitment to carry 
out vetting operations on the charterer (Gregor and Ellis, 
2016). Accordingly, Directive 2014/95/EU’s obligation to 
report on non-financial information, which should include 
data on the due diligence procedures employed throughout 
the whole corporate group, may prove the existence of a 
parental duty of care. The failure to recognize the adverse 
impacts of its subsidiaries’ operations, through the 
fulfillment of appropriate due diligence undertakings, 
would ultimately result in the parent company's direct 
liability for the damage caused. 
 
In the Dutch Shell Cases, the court of first instance 
delivered a seemingly adverse interpretation of the matter. 
It asserted that the fact that RDS had a policy in place, 
aimed at preventing environmental damage caused by its 
subsidiary’s operations abroad, was not sufficient to 
determine that the Dutch company had a duty of care 
towards the Nigerian community affected by the oil spill. 
However, there are a few elements of the decision that 
characterize the Dutch Shell Cases as one of a kind. To 
begin with, it is unclear whether the environmental damage 
was caused by sabotage, rather than by the Nigerian 
subsidiary’s harmful behavior. Inasmuch as Nigerian law 
does not recognize companies’ liability when pipelines are 
subject to sabotage, it cannot be excluded that the court 
would have reached a different outcome, had the damage 
been caused by the subsidiary's direct action or omission. 
Furthermore, RDS’ environmental policy was not part of 
any mandatory obligation to report on non-financial 
information, and possibly lacked specific due diligence 
requirements, necessary to establish an assumption of 
knowledge. Arguably, the obligation set out in Directive 
2014/95/EU, requiring the company to report on the 
outcome of its environmental policies, the risks related to 
its operations (including, for instance, the risks of 
sabotage) and the ways it managed such risks, would have 
facilitated the establishment of RDS’ duty of care and, in 
turn, a breach of such duty.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The determination of a parent company’s duty of care 
based on Directive 2014/95/EU’s non-financial reporting 
obligation has the potential of facilitating the work of 
European national civil courts dealing with foreign direct 
liability cases. Considering the Chandler test, which is 
commonly used to establish parent companies’ duty of care 
by British and non-British courts, judges must prove that 
the parent company is in a position of knowing about its 
subsidiaries’ harmful behavior. According to the British 
court, such knowledge ought to be assessed on the basis of 
a factual analysis, which would prove the parent company’s 
practice of intervening in the subsidiary’s trading 
operations.  As argued in this paper, the parent company’s 
knowledge about its subsidiaries harmful behavior would 
be readily assumed by merely considering the existence of 
a binding obligation to report on the risks related to the 
business activities, pursuant to Directive 2014/95/EU. 
Although the EU instrument does not specifically require 
companies to perform due diligence, but rather to report on 
such practice, the courts could base their determination on 
the existence of a binding obligation upon the company to 
know about any potential risks related to its operations. 
Whether the parent company fails to communicate specific 
risks is not relevant for the establishment of a breach of 
duty of care; the determination is rather based on its 
obligation to know about any potential risk, regardless of 
whether the latter was present in the non-financial 
statement. Based on this reasoning, national courts would 
no longer have to assess whether the parent company had a 
practice of intervening in its subsidiary’s trading operations 
as a way to prove knowledge, but rather the mere existence 
of an obligation to report on information, as to the risks 
encountered throughout the activities, constitutes the 
necessary evidence of knowledge or assumption of 
knowledge needed to prove the existence of a duty of care. 
 
A final court ruling on the matter is still awaiting; however 
some recent legal developments seem to support the 
argument proposed. A very significant step forward in the 
debate was signaled by the adoption of the so-called 
“corporate duty of vigilance law” by the French Parliament, 
in February this year. Around a hundred French companies 
failing to report on their activities’ adverse impacts on 
people and environment, would now be liable to 
compensate for the harm that due diligence would have 
otherwise prevented (ECCJ, 2017). It is plausible, or at 
least desirable, that other European national courts will 
embrace a similar approach, when faced with the issue of 
establishing a parent company’s duty of care, based on 
Directive 2014/95/EU’s non-financial reporting and due 
diligence obligations, or other alike instruments. 
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